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Abstract
This paper presents techniques to solve for optimal simple monetary policy rules in
rational expectations models.  Both the pre-commitment and the discretionary solutions
are considered.  The techniques described are notable for the flexibility they provide over
the structure of the policy rule being solved for.  Specifically, not all state variables need
enter the rule.  This allows rules optimal, conditional on a specified information set, or
structure, to be easily constructed.  The algorithms are illustrated through application to
the models in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Rudebusch (2000).
                                                        
* I am indebted to Charlie Bean, Warwick McKibbin, Graeme Wells, and especially Adrian
Pagan for suggestions on a previous draft.  The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
•   Address for correspondence: Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, 101 Market St, San Francisco CA 94105, USA.  Email: Richard.Dennis@sf.frb.org2
1) Introduction
It is widely known from Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), and Barro and
Gordon (1983) that the issue of time-inconsistency must be confronted when considering
policy in rational expectations models.  In particular, Kydland and Prescott (1977) show
that in models with forward-looking rational expectations, dynamic programming does
not generate an optimal policy program and that optimal policy programs are unlikely to
be implemented because they are not time-consistent.
In the absence of some pre-commitment technology the optimal policy program is not
time-consistent.  However, it is often still relevant and useful to assume that some pre-
commitment technology exists and to solve for optimal pre-commitment rules (Kydland
and Prescott, 1980).  The optimal pre-commitment solution provides a natural benchmark
against which other rules can be compared, thereby quantifying the welfare loss arising
from not having a pre-commitment technology.  Kydland and Prescott (1980) were the
first to describe the optimal policy solution in rational expectations models, using an
example of optimal taxation.  However, they did not implement their solution method
because they found it to be computationally infeasible at that time.  Cohen and Michel
(1984) analytically solved a one state variable problem before Oudiz and Sachs (1985)
presented and implemented a general numerical solution method for discrete-time
1
models with a linear-quadratic objective function
2 (see also Backus and Driffill, 1986).
Around the same time, numerical methods were developed to solve for optimal time-
consistent rules.  The appendix to Kydland and Prescott (1977) outlines one algorithm.
Further algorithms are developed in Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Backus and Driffill (1986),
McKibbin and Sachs (1991), and Krusell, et al, (1997).  A short list of applications would
include McKibbin and Sachs (1988), McKibbin (1993), Svensson (1994, 2000), Krusell,
et al, (1997), and Cooley and Quadrini (1999), who collectively examine issues as
diverse as economic growth, monetary policy rules, and exchange rate regimes.
                                                        
1 See Currie and Levine (1985) for the solution in continuous-time models.3
In many cases it is of interest to solve for optimal pre-commitment and optimal time-
consistent (discretionary) rules.  However, in the monetary policy literature there is a
long and well established tradition of examining simple rules and optimal simple rules
(Bryant, et al, 1993), in part driven by the fact that empirically based policy models often
contain large numbers of state variables.  The curse of dimensionality can then make
solving for optimal pre-commitment rules or optimal discretionary rules infeasible.  And
where optimal rules can be solved they are often large and unwieldy, doing little to aid
transparency and the communication of policy.  Optimal simple rules place precise
restrictions on the information set and structure of the policy rule and optimize over the
remaining free parameters.  Examples include optimal Henderson-McKibbin rules
(Henderson and McKibbin, 1993) and optimal Taylor type rules (Taylor, 1993).  One of
the aims of the optimal simple rules literature is to construct rules that contain just a few
variables and whose performance is comparable to the optimal policy rule.  A natural
way to construct these optimal simple rules is to begin with the optimal policy rule and to
then eliminate state variables whose contribution to optimal policy is ‘small.’
One technique for solving for optimal simple pre-commitment rules is sketched in Oudiz
and Sachs (1985).  Soderlind (1999) describes the solution method in detail.
Applications include Fuhrer (1997), Batini and Haldane (1999), Rudebusch (2000),
Dennis (2000), Leitemo and Soderstrom (2001), and Batini, et al, (2001), all of whom
explore optimized rules for setting short-term nominal interest rates.  It is important,
however, to also be able to solve for optimal simple rules under discretion.  In this paper
we address this issue and present a numerical method that solves for optimal simple
discretionary rules.  Being able to solve for optimal simple discretionary rules allows us
to quantify the benefits of pre-commitment in the context of specific policy rules.
Further, it facilitates construction of high performance simple (discretionary) rules by
sequentially omitting state variable from the optimal discretionary rule.  Moreover, unless
one is prepared to impose some pre-commitment mechanism the discretionary solution is
the natural case to focus on.
                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Applications include Lansing (1998), who examines optimal taxation, and King and Wolman
(1999) and Khan, et al, (2000) who investigate optimal monetary policy.4
We begin in Section 2 by introducing the class of economic models to which the
algorithms we develop can be applied.  This class is relatively broad, encompassing
models with lots of lagged variables as well as models with expectations of future
variables based on different information sets.  Section 2 also presents the form of the
policy objective function.  In Section 3 we describe how to solve for optimal simple pre-
commitment rules.  The pre-commitment algorithm we present parallels Soderlind
(1999), but uses a different representation of the stochastic dynamic policy constraints.
Presenting the pre-commitment solution allows us to build up the apparatus needed to
solve for optimal simple discretionary rules, and makes clear how the pre-commitment
and discretionary solutions differ.
With the pre-commitment solution behind us, Section 4 turns to the discretionary case.
The basic solution approach is to distinguish the policy rule to be applied today from that
to be applied in the future, thereby building in the condition that today’s policy rule does
not constrain future policymakers.  The value function is expressed as a function of both
the future rule and today’s rule and then optimized with respect to the coefficients in
today’s rule.  We then iterate ‘backward through time’ to solve for the perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In Section 5 the techniques developed in Sections 3 and 4 are applied to two benchmark
models drawn from the literature.  We numerically solve for optimal discretionary rules
in the Clarida, et al, (1999) model and replicate their results, demonstrating that the
proposed algorithm can solve for optimal discretionary rules as well as optimal simple
discretionary rules.  We then go on to solve for optimal simple discretionary rules in
Rudebusch’s (2000) model.  Section 6 concludes.  An Appendix shows how objective
functions based on linear combinations of unconditional variances (that are very common
in the monetary policy rules literature) relate to the discounted quadratic objective
function that is more standard elsewhere in the control literature (see also Svensson,
1998, Appendix E).5
2) The General Setup
Consider the following stochastic dynamic macroeconomic structure
t t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 0 v x A y A y A y A + + + = + − t E, vt ~ iid[0,Σ ]( 1 )
where yt is an n× 1 vector of jump and predetermined variables, xt is an p× 1 vector of
policy instruments, and vt is an n× 1 vector of stochastic innovations.  A0, A1, A2, and A3
are matrices of policy- and time-invariant coefficients. The variance-covariance matrix Σ
will in general be singular.  Finally, Et is the mathematical expectation operator
conditional upon period t information, It = {yt, It-1}, and the model’s structure and
parameters are assumed known.
Equation (1) is more general than may first appear.  Systems with more general lead and
lag structures in yt and xt can be manipulated into the form (1).  Moreover, by redefining
variables, expanding the state vector, and exploiting the law of iterated expectations,
expectations of current and/or future variables conditional on period t-s (s > 0)
information are also possible (Binder and Pesaran, 1995).  We provide an example of this
in Section 5.2 when we solve for optimal simple policy rules in Rudebusch’s (2000)
model.
Let zt = [yt
T xt
T]







t t ] [ E L i t i t Wz z 0 < β  < 1. (2)
where W is a symmetric, positive semi-definite, time-invariant, matrix of known policy
weights.  Equation (2) can be written recursively as
1 t t
T
t L ( L + + = t t Wz z 0 < β  < 1. (3)6
It is well known (Sargent, 1987, chapter one) that the value function for infinite horizon
linear-quadratic problems takes the form  d L
T
t + = t t Pz z , which allows (3) to be re-
expressed as
d] [ ( d
T
t
T T + + = + + + 1 t 1 t t t t t Pz z Wz z Pz z 0 < β  < 1. (4)
To continue further requires knowing the recursive equilibrium law of motion describing
how the economy evolves over time.  But the economy’s evolution through time depends
on whether the policymaker can pre-commit to a policy strategy or not.  We begin by
discussing optimal simple pre-commitment rules in Section 3 before turning to optimal
simple discretionary rules in Section 4.
3) Optimal Simple Pre-commitment Rules
The information available to the policymaker when it sets policy is contained in the
vector of predetermined variables, yt-1, and the vector of innovations, vt.  Accordingly it
is these variables that form the basis of the policy rule.  Excluding vt from the rule
imposes the restriction that the rule is formed using period t-1 information.  With simple
rules some state variables and/or innovation terms are omitted from the rule, or otherwise
constrained.  Alternatively, at the expense of elements in yt-1 and vt expectations of future
variables can be built into the reaction function.
3
Let the policy rule take the following general linear form
t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 t v y y x ϕ ϕ ϕ + + = + − t E, ( 5 )
                                                        
3 Note that additional information can only be obtained from expected future variables if some
elements in yt-1 or vt are directly excluded from the rule.  In which case placing expected future
variables in the policy rule amounts to an indirect way of accessing this information.7
where ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3, are feedback coefficient matrices whose values have yet to be
determined.  Elements in these coefficient matrices can be restricted to zero or
constrained in other ways.  We are looking for a stationary policy rule in which the
feedback matrices are time invariant.



























































































which in terms of zt can be written as
t 4 1 t t 2 1 t 1 t 0 u B z E B z B z B + + = + − ,( 6 )
where ut = [vt
T 0
T]


















































 respectively.  Equation (6)























































Equation (7) cannot be solved directly using the methods in Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
because B2 is singular.  However, it can be solved using many other methods, such as
those described Anderson and Moore (1985), Binder and Pesaran (1995), Sims (1996),
King and Watson (1998), McCallum, (1983, 1999), Uhlig, (1999), and Klein (2000).
Provided coefficient feedback matrices ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3, exist such that the number of
eigenvalues in the system with modulus greater than one equals the number of jump
variables in zt, then the system has a unique stable solution.  The solution to the rational
expectations model (7) gives equations describing how the predetermined variables8
evolve over time and how the jump variables respond to the predetermined variables and
the shocks.  These equations can be used to show (see Uhlig, 1999, equation 3.15 for
example) that zt evolves according to
4
t 2 1 t 1 t u z z + = − (8)
From equation (8) the evolution of the system is determined as an implicit function of the
policy feedback coefficients ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3.  Now advancing (8) one time period and
substituting into (4) gives
d] ) ( ) [( ( d
T
t
T T + + + + = + t 2 t 1 t 2 t 1 t t t t u z P u z Wz z Pz z ,( 9 )
where  d
T + t t Pz z  gives the value of the loss function for given coefficient matrices ϕ 1,
ϕ 2, and ϕ 3.  Equation (9) holds for all realizations of zt and ut.  Thus the value of the loss
function for a given policy rule is
] tr[ ￿ - ￿￿ L
T -1 T
t P Pz z 2 2 t t + = , (10)
where P is the fixed point of
1
T
1 P W P + = . (11)
By construction the spectral radius of θ 1 is less than one and the recursive equilibrium
law of motion, equation (8), is stable.  With W known, θ 1 and θ 2 known conditional on
ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3, 0 < β  < 1, and the spectral radius of θ 1 less than one, standard fixed point
solution methods can be applied to (11) to solve for P.  Equation (10) can then be
evaluated and optimized with respect to the policy feedback coefficients ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3.
                                                        
4 Notice that the variables in zt-1 are predetermined.  However, it is not necessarily the case that
all variables in zt are jump variables.  Those variables in zt that are free to jump will be related to9
Computationally the solution procedure is as follows.  First values for ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3, are
postulated such that the rational expectations solution to equation (7) is unique and stable.
The rational expectations model, equation (7), is solved using methods such as Klein
(2000) with the solution to the system given by (8).  We then solve
5 for the fixed point of
equation (11) and substitute this value of P into (10), which is now an implicit function of
ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3.  Equation (10) is then optimized with respect to ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3.  In general,
the feedback coefficients in the optimal simple pre-commitment rule depend on the initial
state of the economy, through  t t Pz z
T in (10), and on the variance-covariance matrix of the
shocks, through Φ  in (10).
Finally, the unconditional variance-covariance matrix for zt,  Ω , can be obtained by




1 1 + = .
4) Optimal Simple Discretionary Rules
Under discretion the central bank cannot commit itself to apply the same policy rule in
the future that it applies today.  As time passes opportunities for the central bank to re-
optimize arise and the policy rule implemented today, or in the past, do not constrain
future policy decisions.  To capture these ideas we draw a distinction between the rule the
central bank proposes to follow today and that it proposes to follow in the future.
Distinguishing between today’s rule and the future rule captures the notion that today’s
                                                                                                                                                                         
zt-1 and ut through the solution to the RE model.  By construction, predetermined variables in zt
will be related to zt-1 through identities.
5 There are several ways to go about solving for the fixed point of equation (11).  One approach is
to make an initial guess of P, P0, (using P0 = W is a useful choice) and then iterate over (11) until
convergence, exploiting the properties of the Contraction Mapping Theorem.  A further approach
is to solve for the fixed point directly using methods like Guass-Seidel.  Alternatively, we can
recognize that equation (11) is an example of a Sylvester Equation and exploit the literature for
solving such equations (See Golub and Van Loan, 1996, pp367-369).10
policymaker cannot tie the hands of future policymakers.  Accordingly we set up today’s
rule as
t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 t v y y x ϕ ϕ ϕ + + = + − t E , (12)
and the future rule as
6
j t 3 1 j t 2 1 j t 1 j t v y y x + + + + − + + + + = j t E ∀  j > 0. (13)
Several aspects of (12) and (13) require clarification.  First, the structure of the rule
cannot change over time, so constraints on ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3 must be matched with identical
constraints on ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3.  This prevents the central bank from proposing to follow a
nominal GDP growth targeting rule in the future while implementing a Taylor type rule
today (for example).  Second, an important special case of (12) and (13) is that where
policy responds to every predetermined variable and every shock.  In this case expected
future variables contain no additional information and ϕ 2 and ψ 2 would naturally be
restricted to equal null matrices.  The special case identified relates to the optimal
discretionary rule, illustrating that the methods developed below can be used to solve for
optimal discretionary rules as well as optimal simple discretionary rules.  We demonstrate
this is Section 5.1 were we solve for the optimal discretionary state-contingent rule in the
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) model.  Third, because the two rules are state-
contingent they describe how policy will be set in any given state, regardless of how the
economy arrived at that state.  In particular, equation (13) describes how future policy
will be set, given the state, regardless of whether the economy arrived at that state along
an equilibrium path or not.
                                                        
6 Assuming the same policy rule for all future periods is without loss of generality.  The
optimization problem is time-invariant and consequently in equilibrium all policymakers end up
applying the same policy rule.  In solving for this equilibrium policy rule the essential property to
capture is that policy decisions made today do not constrain future policymakers.  Distinguishing
between today’s rule and the future rule captures this property.11
Before moving on to the solution algorithm itself, we note that although today’s
policymaker sets policy for today with the understanding that it cannot constrain future
policymakers’ behavior, it still cares and accounts for the consequences of its decisions in
all future periods.  Thus discretionary policy is not to be confused with myopic policy, in
which a policymaker only accounts for the losses that occur over the period for which
that policymaker’s rule is applied.
4.1)  Solving the System
The optimization problem is to find the rule that minimizes the objective function, (2),
subject to equation (1), and the requirement that no policymaker has an incentive to
depart from this rule as time passes and opportunities to re-optimize arrive.  Thus the rule
solved for is the outcome of a perfect Nash equilibrium in the game played between
current and future policymakers; it is therefore time-consistent.  We begin by considering
period t+1, solve for the period t optimal policy rule conditional on the policy rule
followed in periods t+1 onward, and then iterate ‘backward through time’ to reach a fixed
point.  Following Section 2, advance the time subscript on (1) and augment (1) with (13),
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The variance-covariance matrix of ut+t = [vt+1
T 0
T]
T, Φ , is directly and clearly related to
the variance-covariance matrix of vt+1, Σ .  Continuing to follow Section 2, equation (14),
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.12
Provided matrices ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3 exist such that the system has the same number of
eigenvalues with modulus greater than one as there are jump variables in zt+1, the system





1 1 t u z z + + + = , (15)
where θ 1
* and θ 2
* are functions of ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3.  By construction, the spectral radius of
θ 1
* is less than one.  Thus far the solution procedure has followed step-by-step that used
to solve for optimal simple pre-commitment rules, albeit applied to period t+1 onward
rather than period t onward.  It is at this point that the discretionary solution algorithm
departs from the pre-commitment solution algorithm.  Take the mathematical expectation
of equation (15) conditional on period t information, and substitute the resulting
expression into equation (1).  Provided  ] [
*
1 3 0 B B −  has full rank this results in
1 t 2 1 t 1 t 4 1 t 2
*
1 3 0 t u z u B z B B B z + − −
− + = + − =
def
1 ] [ ] [ . (16)
The recursive equilibrium law of motion, equation (16), is a function of future policy
through θ 1
* and today’s policy through B2, B1, and B4.  Advancing equation (16) one time
period and substituting into (4) gives the policy loss conditional on the proposed policy
rules
] tr[ ￿ - ￿￿ L
T -1 T
t P Pz z 2 2 t t + = , (17)
where P is again the fixed point of
1
T
1 P W P + = .
Equation (17) is a function of the feedback parameters in the future policy rule as well as
those in today’s policy rule. The procedure is to now differentiate equation (17) with13
respect to ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3 while holding ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3 constant, then set ϕ 1 = ψ 1, ϕ 2 = ψ 2,
ϕ 3 = ψ 3 and solve for the fixed-point of the first order equation.  Notice, however, that, in
general, the feedback coefficients in the optimal simple discretionary rule depend on the
initial state of the economy and on the variance-covariance matrix of the stochastic
innovations.
Computationally, this fixed point can be solved for as follows.  Given values of ϕ 1, ϕ 2,
ϕ 3, ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3 that satisfy the necessary uniqueness and stability conditions required
to construct θ 1, θ 2, and P, equation (17) can easily be evaluated and then numerically
optimized with respect to ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3 holding ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3 constant.  Recognizing
that the future policymaker faces the same optimization problem as the current
policymaker we can use the newly optimized values of ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3 as revised guesses
at the feedback coefficients in the future policy rule.  That is we set ψ 1 = ϕ 1, ψ 2 = ϕ 2, and
ψ 3 = ϕ 3, and with this new guess at the future policy reaction function re-solve the future
period rational expectations model to obtain updated values of θ 1
* and θ 2
*.  A new
recursive equilibrium law of motion, equation (16), is obtained and (17) is again
optimized with respect to ϕ 1, ϕ 2, and ϕ 3 while again holding ψ 1, ψ 2, and ψ 3, constant.
This iterative procedure continues until a fixed point is obtained in which the newly
optimized feedback parameters in today’s policy rule equal those proposed in the future
policy rule: ϕ 1 = ψ 1, ϕ 2 = ψ 2, and ϕ 3 = ψ 3.  The resulting fixed point is a perfect Nash
equilibrium and the policy rule is the optimal (simple) time-consistent (discretionary)
rule.  This solution procedure is illustrated through application in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
As with the pre-commitment solution, the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of zt,




1 1 + = . (18)14
Note that in the perfect Nash equilibrium θ 1 = θ 1
*, and by construction the spectral radius
of θ 1
* is less than one.  Consequently Ω  can be solved from equation (18) using standard
fixed-point solution methods.
5) Two Applications
In this Section we apply the algorithms developed in Sections 3 and 4 to two models
drawn from the literature.  The first model that we apply the algorithms to is that in
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) (CGG).  The CGG model is very useful as a testing
ground because the model is simple, forward-looking, and contains just two state
variables.  Moreover, the model is simple enough for analytic solutions to be obtained
making it particularly easy to test the algorithms.  We numerically solve for the optimal
discretionary rule and the optimal state-contingent pre-commitment rule.  This latter rule
assumes pre-commitment, and contains information from both state variables, but
excludes the Lagrange multiplier terms that would enter the rule if we were to solve for
the optimal pre-commitment rule.
The second model that we consider is that in Rudebusch (2000).  Rudebusch’s model
contains eleven independent state variables making it a slightly more challenging
numerical problem.  We consider optimal simple Taylor type rules and optimal simple
nominal GDP growth rules under both pre-commitment and discretion.  The solution for
the optimal simple Taylor type rule under pre-commitment for an objective function
without discounting is presented in Rudebusch (2000).
5.1) Example One – Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
Our example is taken from Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s (1999) Journal of Economic
Literature paper.  CGG’s analysis is theoretical, but we take their New Keynesian model
and parameterize it for simulation purposes.  They provide analytic solutions that we use
to verify our results with theirs.  Their model has two key equations: those for the output
gap and inflation.  Both demand and supply shocks are persistent, modeled as simple15
AR(1) processes.  The model also has a policy reaction function determined optimally, so
the complete system has five equations.  The system is
t 1 t t t 1 t t t g ] E >L y E y + − − = + + γ  > 0
t t 1 t t t u \ ( + + = + 0 < β  < 1, λ  > 0
where yt is the output gap, π t is inflation, gt is a demand shock, and ut is a supply shock.
The demand and supply shocks are modeled respectively as
t 1 t t J g + = − 0 ≤  µ  < 1
t 1 t t v X u + = − .0   ≤  ρ  < 1





























































































































































As indicated in (19) the monetary authority sets the level of the nominal interest rate as a
linear function of the demand disturbance gt and expected future inflation Etπ t+1.  This
rule makes use of all information in the state vector and is therefore the optimal
discretionary rule.
7  The policy objective function is
                                                        
7 In general we do not recommend solving for optimal discretionary rules using the techniques











t t ] ) ￿\ ) ￿￿ - [(1 ￿( (1 L 0 ≤  α  < 1.
The scalar (1-β ) outside the conditional expectation simply re-normalizes the objective
function without changing the optimal policy.  Provided the system is stabilizable, in the
limit as β→ 1 this objective function tends to a linear combination of the unconditional
variances of inflation and the output gap (see the Appendix).  CGG’s model assumes that
period t expectations are formed, and period t policy decisions made, with all agents
knowing the structure of the economy and aware of all variables dated period t or earlier.
Thus policymakers know the demand and supply shocks before they set policy.
8
Because demand shocks move output and inflation pro-cyclically, and they are observed,
it is always optimal for policymakers to eliminate the influence of these demand shocks
from the system – regardless of policy preferences.  Consequently the coefficient applied
to the demand disturbance in the optimal policy reaction function is invariant to the
weight placed on output in the policy objective function, α .
                                                                                                                                                                         
derivatives and are better suited for solving for optimal simple discretionary rules, which typically
contain just a few feedback coefficients.  To solve for optimal discretionary rules better numerical
accuracy can be obtained using methods such as those in Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Backus and
Driffill (1986), or Soderlind (1999), which make full use of analytic derivatives.
8 To simulate the model we set: β  = 0.99; γ  = 0.8; λ  = 0.4; µ  =  ρ  = 0.5; σ y =  σ v = 1; and σ yπ  = 0.17
Table One:   Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999) Model
Solution under Discretion
Feedback Coefficients Standard Deviations %
1-α gt Etπ t+1 yt π t it Loss
0.00 1.250 1.000 0.000 2.287 1.841 0.000
0.20 1.250 1.125 0.212 2.119 1.872 0.921
0.40 1.250 1.333 0.503 1.888 1.915 1.557
0.60 1.250 1.750 0.930 1.550 1.981 1.764
0.80 1.250 3.000 1.614 1.008 2.091 1.317
1.00 1.250 ∞ 2.887 0.000 2.311 0.000
Solution under Pre-commitment
Feedback coefficients Standard Deviations %
1-α gt Etπ t+1 yt π t it Loss
0.00 1.250 1.000 0.000 2.287 1.841 0.000
0.20 1.250 1.248 0.391 1.977 1.898 0.892
0.40 1.250 1.660 0.851 1.612 1.968 1.455
0.60 1.250 2.485 1.400 1.178 2.056 1.595
0.80 1.250 4.960 2.064 0.652 2.167 1.176
1.00 1.250 ∞ 2.887 0.000 2.311 0.000
Table One presents the optimal policy reaction functions for a range of values for α .  In
solving for these policy rules we assumed that in the initial period the economy was at
steady state.  The upper panel corresponds to discretion, the lower panel to pre-
commitment.  As expected the coefficient applied to the demand disturbance, gt, is
invariant to α  for both pre-commitment and discretion, and its value serves to eliminate
the effects of the demand shock from the system.  Also observe that in the extreme cases
where  α  = 0, 1 all volatility in inflation and output (respectively) is completely
eliminated.  This is a consequence of agents and policymakers knowing the disturbances
prior to making their decisions.18
Unsurprisingly, in the cases where α  = 0, 1 the optimal pre-commitment and the optimal
discretionary solutions coincide.  In these two special cases the problem collapses to that
where there is one instrument matched against a single policy goal.  With one instrument
and one goal the system is controllable, ruling out time-inconsistent behavior.  Outside
these two extreme cases, in which the system is controllable, the loss under discretion is
as much as 12% (α  = 0.2) more than the loss under pre-commitment.
9
CGG show analytically that with discretion the solution to the system is
10 (using our
parameterization of the objective function)
t 2 t u






t 2 t u
￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 − + −
= (21)










+ = + (22)
With our assigned parameter values in equations (20) - (22), varying α  generates results
identical to those obtained numerically in the upper panel of Table One.  Note also that in
the limiting case where α  →  0 the interest rate’s response to expected future inflation
becomes infinite.  However, even in this limiting case the policy rule can be written in
terms of the state variables ut and gt (the α  in the numerator of (21) cancels with the α  in
the denominator of (22)), and with the rule in this form unconditional variances for yt, π t,
and it can be obtained.  An identical cancellation occurs in the pre-commitment solution.
                                                        
9 Here we are comparing the loss under the optimal discretionary rule to that under the optimal
state-contingent pre-commitment rule.  If we instead compared the optimal discretionary rule to
the optimal pre-commitment rule, then the relative performance of the discretionary rule would be
even worse.19
5.2)  Example Two – Rudebusch (2000)
In this subsection we examine the forward-looking macro-econometric model developed




3 t 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 t t ) E 0.09(i 0.27y 1.15y y + − − − = + − − − −
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3 t 1 t t 0.13y ) 0.13 0.40 0.14 0.71(0.67 0.29E + + + + − + = − − − − − + −







t .  Rudebusch (2000) uses the
policy objective function
] 9DU> L ] 9DU> ] ￿9DU>\ (1 ] Loss[0, t
a
t t + + − = ∞ , (23)
focusing on the benchmark case in which α  = 0.5 and ν  = 0.25.  The Appendix shows
how this policy objective function, which is in terms of unconditional variances, relates
to the discounted quadratic objective function, equation (2).  We solve for optimal Taylor
type rules (Taylor, 1993) and optimal nominal GDP growth rules under both pre-
commitment and discretion.  The form of the policy objective function, equation (23),
means that the feedback coefficients in these optimal simple rules do not depend on the
initial state of the economy, see the Appendix.  We also solve for policy rules using the
discounted objective function, equation (2), in which the output gap, annual inflation, and
the change in the Federal funds rate are the target variables entering the function.  In this
case we assume that the economy is initially in steady state and use the same values for α
and ν  as above.  The two rules examined take the form
                                                                                                                                                                         
10 The following three equations are equivalent to equations 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 in Clarida, et al,
(1999).
11 Rudebusch’s model can be expressed in terms of equation (1) by defining:
yt = [π t
a Etπ t+4 Etπ t+3 Etπ t+2 Etπ t+1 π t π t-1 π t-2 π t-3 yt yt-1 ∆it]
T and xt = it.20
t 2
a
t 1 t y i ϕ ϕ + = (Taylor type rule)
] y [y i t 1 t t 3 t + − = − ϕ (Nominal GDP growth rule)
Results are presented in Table Two.
Table Two – Rudebusch (2000) Model
Taylor type rule: α  = 0.5, κ = 0.25
Discretion βϕ 1 ϕ 2 sd[yt] sd[π t
a] sd[it] Loss
1.000 2.720 1.746 1.761 1.688 4.391 3.821
0.990 2.657 1.707 1.763 1.714 4.364 3.638
0.975 2.565 1.649 1.767 1.753 4.326 3.382
Pre-commitment
1.000 2.870 1.740 1.790 1.634 4.448 3.811
0.990 2.808 1.701 1.793 1.656 4.421 3.629
0.975 2.717 1.644 1.797 1.691 4.382 3.374
Nominal GDP growth rule: α  = 0.5, κ = 0.25
Discretion βϕ 3 sd[yt] sd[π t] sd[it] Loss
1.000 1.884 2.221 2.536 4.855 7.951
0.990 1.839 2.218 2.595 4.845 7.373
0.975 1.771 2.214 2.694 4.839 6.618
Pre-commitment
1.000 1.937 2.225 2.472 4.870 7.940
0.990 1.889 2.222 2.530 4.856 7.363
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As expected, policy under pre-commitment outperforms policy under discretion.
Strikingly, however, the gains to pre-commitment are small, much smaller than those21
obtained for the CGG model earlier.  This probably stems from the fact that Rudebusch’s
model is not as forward-looking as the CGG model.  Finally note that the performance of
the nominal GDP targeting rules is much worse than that of the Taylor type rules.  They
generate a good deal more volatility in annual inflation and the output gap, as well as
greater interest rate volatility.
6) Conclusions
A large portion of the monetary policy rules literature examines the properties of optimal
simple rules.  Where these rules have been constructed and evaluated in forward-looking
models it has always been assumed that the policymaker could pre-commit to the rule.
This paper extends the literature on solving for optimal simple rules to the case where the
policymaker cannot pre-commit.  It is desirable to be able to solve for optimal simple
discretionary rules for three principle reasons.  First, to assess a variable’s marginal
contribution to optimal policy it is necessary to solve for policy rules that both include
and exclude the variable in question.  Second, it is informative to be able to assess the
advantages to pre-commitment in the context of specific policy rules.  Third, unless one
is prepared to impose some pre-commitment mechanism the discretionary solution
arguably would appear to be the most relevant.
Section 2 described the class of economic model to which the proposed algorithm can be
applied.  Section 3 showed how to solve for optimal simple pre-commitment rules by
numerically choosing the feedback coefficients in the policy rule to minimize the policy
objective function.  Using the apparatus established for the pre-commitment case, Section
4 turned to the case of discretion.  We showed that distinguishing between today’s rule
and the future rule, and not allowing today’s policymakers to tie the hands of future
policymakers, allows us to solve for optimal simple discretionary rules.  We indicated
how the initial state of the economy could affect the coefficients in these optimal simple
rules.  Furthermore, we discussed the relationship between the standard discounted22
quadratic objective function and the linear combination of unconditional variances most
commonly used in the policy rules literature.
Section 5 applied the techniques developed in Sections 3 and 4 to two models in the
literature.  For the first of these models, the Clarida, et al, (1999) model, we used the
algorithms to solve for optimal state-contingent rules and replicated their results.  We
further showed that the dynamic gains to pre-commitment were potentially large.  For the
second model, developed in Rudebusch (2000), we solved for optimal simple Taylor type
rules and optimal nominal GDP growth rules and showed that Taylor types rules were
vastly superior to nominal GDP growth rules and that, for these simple rules, the
advantages to pre-commitment were minor.  This latter funding is intriguing because it
stands in sharp relief to the results obtained from the CGG model.  While their
convergence properties have yet to be explored in detail, the solution methods presented
are simple to apply and appear to converge without difficulty.
Appendix One – On the discounted quadratic loss function as β  →  1.
In this appendix we elaborate on a result in Svensson (1998) to show how the objective
function Rudebusch (2000), among many others, uses relates to the standard discounted
quadratic objective function, equation (2).
Recall that under both pre-commitment and discretion the value function, with
discounting, was
] tr[ ￿ - ￿￿ L
T -1 T
t P Pz z 2 2 t t + = ,( B 1 )
with P the solution to
1
T
1 P W P + = .( B 2 )23
Differences between pre-commitment and discretion arose in the specific θ 1, θ 2, and P
matrices entering (B1) and (B2), but the two algorithms share (B1) and (B2) in their
solution structure.  Recall also that the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of zt is
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Multiplying equation (B1) through by (1-β ) gives
] WU> ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t P Pz z 2 2 t t + − = .( B 4 )
Equation (B4) is equivalent to
] WU> ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t 2 2 t t P Pz z + − = ,( B 5 )
which, employing (B3), can be re-expressed as
)] - ( WU> ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t 1 1 t t P Pz z + − = .( B 6 )
Expanding terms in equation (B6) gives
] WU> - ] WU> ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t 1 1 t t P P Pz z + − = .( B 7 )
Now equation (B7) is equivalent to
] WU> - ] WU> ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t P P Pz z 1 1 t t + − =
or24
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Finally, substituting equation (B2) into equation (B8) produces
] ) ￿ - (1 WU>￿ ￿ (1 ￿/ - (1
T T
t P W Pz z 1 1 t t − + − = .
In the limit as β   →  1,  ] tr[ ￿/ (1 t W → − , provided  0 ￿ (1
T → − t t Pz z  and
0 ￿ (1
T → − 1 1P .  These two terms converge to zero provided the solution to equation
(B2) is bounded as β  →  1.  It is clear that the fixed-point solution to equation (B2) will be
bounded when the spectral radius of θ 1 is less than one, which from Hamiltion (1994,
pp186) amounts to the requirement that when subject to control zt be weakly stationary
and ergodic.  In control theory terms, zt must be stabilizable.  But the condition that the
spectral radius of θ 1 be less than one arises naturally from the solution algorithms in
Sections 3 and 4.  Consequently, the optimization problem is well defined in the limiting
case where β   →  1 and the objective function can be expressed in terms of a linear
combination of unconditional variances, as per Rudebusch (2000).
Note that the term  t t Pz z
T in equation (B1) describes how the feedback coefficients in the
optimal simple rule depend on the initial state vector.  In the limiting case where β  →  1
the dependence of the policy rule on the initial state vector vanishes.
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